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1  Introduction  
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine and shed light on why Finland`s and Sweden`s 10-
year bond yields differ during 1995-2013. The motivation for the study comes from the 
fact that the bond yield spread
1
 of Finland and Sweden has become tighter and 
occasionally even sharply positive (see figure 1), although credit ratings for the two 
have stayed fairly stable
2
. One possible explanation is that Finland`s EMU membership 
has contributed to a riskier outlook about its ability to serve its debt. This explanation is 
supported by Paul De Grauwe`s view that the lack of a lender of last resort
3
 for euro 
countries signals that bond repayment at maturity is not guaranteed (De Grauwe 2011). 
De Grauwe (2011) noticed that bond yields for Spain were rising and started to differ 
from UK`s bond yield since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, although UK:s 
Debt to GDP ratio rose more rapidly. He concluded that the EMU membership of Spain 
was the main reason for this.  
 
There are lots of articles regarding the determinants of bond yield spreads of different 
countries. Especially European debt crisis raised
4
 the question whether the financial 
markets worked rationally when bond spreads surged in European periphery countries 
such as Greece after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September, 2008. The majority 
of research is done by using panel data and studying several countries at the same time. 
Problem in panel data studies is the assumption of homogeneity (bond yields in every 
country respond to fiscal fundamentals
5
 in a same way) which can be partially relaxed 
by adding country specific fixed effects, but still the slope coefficients suffer from 
homogeneity
6
. (Poghosyan 2012). Panel data allows researcher to study so called 
                                                 
1 Bond yield spread (bond spread) is a difference between two countries bond yields. Bond spread 
formula is simply: Country A`s bond yield at time t – Country B`s bond yield at time t. In most of the 
studies bond spreads are calculated against Germany. 
 
2 See, for example, the credit ratings from Fitch Ratings Inc. at 
https://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/ratings/sovereign_ratings_history.xls 
 
3 Lender of last resort is a lender (typically a central bank), which borrows money to financial institutions 
when they can`t borrow from the markets. (OECD 2001). 
 
4 The European debt crisis started in the late 2009 and there is still no clear ending point for it.  
 
5 Fiscal fundamental is any country specific key figure which gives information about country`s 
economical situation, for example, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate or public deficit to GDP. 
 
6 Nickel et al. (2009) find that expected deficit is important in explaining spreads in five  
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contagion between countries. According to Roberto De Santis (2012), contagion is a 
situation in which instability in a particular market transmits to one or many other 
markets. Measuring contagion is controversial and there are many definitions of how to 
do it. Studies using different definition and measurement for contagion make results 
hard to compare. Simply contagion can be some part of the bond yield that is not 
explained by independent variables. These independent variables are often measuring 
credit risk, liquidity risk and risk aversion. 
 
My approach, to study the determinants of Finland-Sweden bond spread, is to use time-
series data and run a dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using Finland-
Sweden bond yield spread as dependent variable and proxies of theory based bond 
pricing elements as explanatory variables. Bond pricing elements consist of credit risk, 
risk aversion and liquidity risk. Also Germany`s 10-year bond yield has been added as 
explanatory variable because Germany`s bond yield is likely a base of Finland`s bond 
yield (Germany`s yield is considered as a risk free euro rate). The main issue in the 
study is that Finland and Sweden bond yields are in different currencies (euro and 
krona), so the possible changes in expected exchange rates may cause bond yields to 
change. I take this into account by using Uncovered Interest Rate Parity -theorem
7
 and 
thus, by adding a variable consisting of Germany`s and Sweden`s 6-months treasury bill 
yield spreads
8
. Although, in theory, a 6-month treasury bill yield difference tells from 
currency expectations only 6-months forward, it can give information about the 
exchange rate expectations of investors. Even if the Expected exchange rate variable 
does not capture all of the real variation, it can be argued that the sharp movements in 
the bond spread, especially between 2008-2012, were probably not caused by changes 
in exchange rate expectations because the bond spread movements during that period 
tend to move together with Finland-Germany 10-year bond spread, which is measured 
in the same euro currency. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
emerging economies. However, after running separate single-country regressions they 
can confirm the results for only two countries. 
 
7 Uncovered interest rate parity is a parity condition which states that any difference in interest rates 
between two countries is equal to the expected change in exchange rates between the countries. 
(Investopedia 2015). 
 
8 Treasury bills with such a short maturities can be considered as bearing no risk, so the difference in yield 
should mainly tell about currency value expectations. 
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In addition to the regression analysis, I visually study the effect of Finland`s EMU 
membership by plotting Finland-Sweden bond spread with events that may have 
contributed to it such as the ECB`s announcements of SMP and OMT. The main idea is 
to show how large seems to be the effect of OMT announcement compared to other 
important announcements. The plot analysis is first applied for the years 2007-2013 as 
this period contains fast and relatively large movements in euro countries bond spreads 
that are not likely explained by basic slowly changing fiscal fundamentals such as 
Deficit to GDP ratio. I also discuss about plots regarding OMT, Risk aversion and 
Convergence of bond yields. It should be emphasized that the plot analysis is 
speculative and should not be considered as giving any real information about the 
causalities between certain events and bond spreads. Rather the plot analysis is here to 
show that possibly other things than country specific fiscal fundamentals may have 
affected the bond spread as well. In this study, the crisis period is the period 07/2007-
12/2013.  
 
The remainder of the paper is in nine sections. First, I give a literature review from the 
subject. Second, I discuss about the potential link between the Finland`s EMU 
membership and the bond spread. Third, I tell about the theoretical approach of the 
study. Fourth, I discuss about how to measure the theoretical elements of the bond 
spread. Fifth, I introduce the data and explain how the variables are constructed. Sixth, I 
present the linear regression model and show the results from the different model 
specifications. Seventh, I conduct the plot analysis, and eighth, I conclude the study.  
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Figure 1. Finland-Sweden 10-year bond spread and Debt to GDP ratio. Time period 
01/1995-12/2013. Source. Bank of Finland, Eurostat and Riksbank. 
2   Literature review 
2.1  Single-country studies 
Gibson et al. (2011) aim to explain the reasons which led into financial crisis in Greece 
in 2009. The authors are especially interested in the connection between growing fiscal 
imbalances and bond spreads. Paper uses two main empirical approaches to examine the 
determinants of bond spreads. First, the authors study bonds risk premium
9
 by 
decomposing it into a part which can be explained by credit ratings and a part which is 
irrational and thus describes the idiosyncratic factors of the markets. Credit ratings are 
                                                 
9Risk premium is here defined: R(GR)=R(GB)+P+E,  where R(GR) is interest rate for Greece, R(GB)  
interest rate for Germany (Considered as risk free rate), P=Risk premium, E=Error term. 
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assumed to reflect strongly the fiscal fundamentals so the irrational part of the risk 
premium may be a sign of underpricing or overpricing the risk in the market. Second, 
they investigate Greek bond spreads relative to Germany`s 10-year bond by using 
monthly data from the period 2000-2010. Determinants of the bond spreads are studied 
using time series cointegration techniques such as VAR, and the goal is to find the long-
term fiscal fundamentals that affect the spread. Unlike in many other studies, panel data 
is not used.
 
After the authors have estimated the cointegrating relationship between the 
macroeconomic determinants and Greek bond spreads, they compare estimates to actual 
values. They find that markets have undervalued risk from the end of 2004 up to the 
middle of 2005 and overvalued when the crisis erupted in 2009. De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012) had similar results suggesting that there was undervaluation of risk in Greece 
spreads during 2001-2008 and overvaluation of risk during 2010-2011. Also Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2012) find evidence for such mispricing behavior, however they emphasize 
that it`s always hard to estimate such mispricing as it would require precise knowledge 
of what the real equilibrium price should be. Their results suggest that there may have 
been differences in pricing of the risk between pre-crisis and crisis period. For example, 
if Greek fiscal fundamentals were priced as in the crisis period then the bond spread 
would have been higher during the pre-crisis period. They propose that there has been a 
wake-up
10
 call between investor so when the crisis erupted investors began to price the 
fiscal fundamentals more strongly. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) and Afonso et al. (2012) 
find similar evidence that the fiscal fundamentals became more important to investors 
when the crisis started. 
 
The fiscal fundamentals in the Greece study are: measure for fiscal situation (latest 
estimates of fiscal Deficit to GDP ratio and Debt to GDP ratio), measure for 
competitiveness
11
, measure for economic activity (coincident indicator of economic 
activity constructed by Bank of Greece), measures for external factors such as oil 
price
12
. The authors also use a measure for fiscal news and find it significant in 
explaining spread movements. Also oil prices, economic activity, relative prices 
(measure for competitiveness) are significant factors. The authors explain that the other 
                                                 
10 Wake-up call or fundamental contagion: A sharp rise in the sensitivity of financial  
markets to fundamentals (Beirne and Fratzscher 2012). 
 
11Competitiveness was measured by comparing Greek price level to Germany`s price level. This aimed to 
catch the real appreciation. Also trade- and current accounts (as percentage of  GDP)  were used. 
 
12Greece is highly dependent on imported oil from outside the Euro Economic Area (European  
Commission 2013). 
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factors such as Debt to GDP ratio are insignificant because their effects were captured 
by the significant factors. For example, the measure for fiscal news is best in capturing 
the state of government’s fiscal situation. 
 
Other relevant single-country studies are Linde (2001), Nickel et al. (2009) and Chinn-
and Frankell (2005). Linde finds that higher budget deficit in Sweden lead to higher 
government borrowing costs in 1982-1996. Nickel et al. (2009) examine emerging 
economies by using both panel regressions and country specific regressions. They find 
budget deficits as an important factor for two out of five countries. In their panel 
regressions they get biased results compared to country specific results so they suggest 
that the importance of individual explanatory variables varies across countries. Chinn-
and Frankell (2005) studied the period 1988-2004, and they find that an increase in Debt 
to GDP ratio raises bond yields in Germany less than in other European countries 
(France, UK, Spain, Italy). These results suggest that the homogenous approach (used in 
panel data studies) towards euro countries should be used with caution. 
 
2.2  Panel data studies 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2012) study the determinants of bond spreads and CDS
13
 spreads 
in 31 advanced and emerging countries. They find fiscal fundamentals and the wake-up 
call as the most important determinants of spreads in the period 2008-2011. Fiscal 
fundamentals didn`t explain much of the changes in bond spreads of euro countries 
during pre-crisis period (2000-2007). The authors give three reasons for this different 
pricing behavior of the investors. First, the investors may have priced the same fiscal 
fundamentals in different way during crisis period, for example, they may have ignored 
them before the crisis. Second, a negative shock in other euro country such as Greece 
may have affected other euro countries bond yields because investors fear the spreading 
of the shock (Regional contagion). Third, there could have been herding behavior or 
panic among the investors (Pure contagion). The authors find no support for the 
Regional contagion in eurozone during the crisis, however, these regional spillovers of 
risk seem to be more important in pre-crisis period suggesting that euro countries bonds 
were priced within the region despite the differences in fiscal fundamentals. Pure 
                                                 
13Credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap which transfers credit risk between seller  
parties. The buyer of CDS receives credit protection so in the case of default the seller of CDS pays the  
loan to the buyer. 
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contagion had a role in bond pricing during the crisis period but it was relatively not as 
important as the fiscal fundamentals and the wake-up call. Haugh et al. (2009) find that 
risk aversion interacted with expected Deficit to GDP- and Debt to GDP ratio and 
amplified their effect on spreads i.e. the wake-up call was due to increased risk 
aversion. 
 
De Santis (2012) examines euro country bond spreads (against Germany) during the 
crisis 2008-2011 and finds three reasons for the developments. First, an aggregate 
regional risk factor (measures risk aversion and flight-to-liquidity), which explains 
changes in all euro area spreads and was the main reason for Finland`s bond spread 
changes. Second, a country-specific credit risk, and third, a spillover effect from 
Greece. Negative spillover from Greece affected mostly countries with weak 
fundamentals such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain. De Santis (2013) gets similar results 
for euro countries when studying a longer period 2006-2012. Flight-to-liquidity and 
flight-to-quality were still the key determinants for Finland. The author measures the 
aggregate risk factor by German KFW-bond and German bond which are both 
guaranteed by the government thus carrying the same credit risk. According to Giordano 
et all. (2012), Finland and other core countries benefited from flight-to-quality during 
crisis. Also Poghosyan (2012 ) concludes in a similar way. It may thus be that Finland 
and Germany both benefited from flight-to-quality but Germany more, partially due to 
its larger (more liquid) bond markets. 
 
Poghosyan (2012) distinguishes between short-run effects and long-run effects in bond 
yields using panel cointegration techniques. He uses a potential growth rate variable and 
a debt to GDP variable as long-run determinants and finds both as significant factors. 
Both coefficient signs are positive so also a rise in potential growth rate leads to 
increase in bond spreads. The relationship between long-run determinants and bond 
spreads has weakened since the start of the EMU. From short-run determinants of real 
bond yields
14
 the author calls important: inflation, short-term interest rate and Debt to 
GDP ratio. Inflation affected real bond yields negatively, the author suggests that this is 
due to surprise inflation. The other two variables affected positively on bond spreads. 
Almost half of the deviation in real bond yields from their long-run equilibrium adjusted 
in one year. 
 
                                                 
14 Poghosyan (2012) studies real bond yields so he has adjusted bond yields for inflation. 
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In other relevant studies, Dell`Erba et al. (2013) find that Debt to GDP ratio is 
statistically significant in explaining Sweden`s bond spreads. In the study of Attinasi et 
al. (2009), expected Debt to GDP ratio and expected Deficit to GDP ratio are found 
important determinants for Finland`s bond spread (against Germany), explaining up to 
39% of the spread changes. 
3  Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership as the 
difference between Finland and Sweden 
 
Finland passed the control of its monetary policy to European Central Bank (ECB) 
when it joined the third stage of EMU in 1999. According to De Grauwe (2011), losing 
the capacity to issue debt in a currency one has control of can cause bond yields to rise.  
He explains that Spain has to pay higher interest rate on its 10-year bond than UK 
although the deficit and the debt in Spain are much lower than those in UK.  This 
happens because UK has control over its currency and central bank
15
, thus UK can 
implicitly guarantee that it will have the liquidity to pay off the bond at maturity (De 
Grauwe 2011).  According to De Grauwe`s theory, bond spreads should come down if 
ECB presents itself as the lender of last resort.   
 
In July 2012, the president of ECB, Mario Draghi promised that ECB will do “whatever 
it takes” to save euro. In addition, in September 2012, ECB announced details from its 
new program called Outright Monetary Transactions
16
 (OMT) which allows ECB to buy 
bonds (unlimited quantities) of euro countries having difficulties in debt issuing. These 
announcements were likely to cause falls in bond yields of struggling economies such as 
Greece, Spain and Italy
17
. Johnson and Santor (2013) find that the announcement of 
OMT declined the dispersion in government bond yields across the eurozone. According 
to them, this supports the hypothesis that country specific risk factors (for example, 
fiscal fundamentals of a country) started to become less relevant and the common 
                                                 
15
Bank of England is independent public organization so basically UK government can’t force it to buy 
UK bonds. However during crisis “loyalty” or even a change in legislation could start bond purchases. 
 
16 Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)  is a bond purchasing program which allows  
ECB to buy bonds issued by euro countries, under certain conditions, from the secondary 
bond markets. 
 
17  See, for example, De Santis 2013, Altavilla et al. 2014, Saka et al. 2014 and Hochstein  
2013. 
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eurozone interest rate factor became relatively more important. This was probably the 
extreme case in the pre-crisis period when bond yields in eurozone moved very closely 
to each other so there was a very high integration (See, for example, Tumpel-Gugerell 
2005). Beirne and Fratzscher (2012) were unable to find reason for this pre-crisis 
situation, but they state that it could be due to ignorance of fiscal fundamentals and/or 
implicit bail-out guarantee which basically means that a member country couldn`t get in 
a difficulties as other member countries would save it. There is somewhat consensus in 
the literature that financial markets underpriced the risk in euro area before the crisis 
(see, for example, ECB (2014)). The OMT program has never been activated so just the 
presence of it has been remarkable for bond spreads and thus helps countries like Spain 
to access funding at lower interest rates. De Grauwe (2014) finds that Spain and UK 10-
year government bond yields have converged and are almost equal in 2014 although 
Spain`s Debt to GDP ratio is already higher than UK`s. He concludes that this happened 
due to OMT. Spain`s 10-year bond yield has even been close to that of US which is 
normally considered as safe haven. However, inflation rates in Spain are expected to be 
lower than in US so real yields still differ. 
 
 The predecessor of OMT was called Securities Market Program
18
 (SMP). According to 
De Grauwe (2012), SMP didn`t work as planned because it was limited in size and time. 
However, there is some evidence that SMP program was able to reduce bond yields in 
countries it was targeted (see, for example, Kilponen et al. 2012 and Ghysels et al. 
2014). European Stability Mechanism
19
 (ESM) is another safeguard mechanism made 
for providing liquidity to a member country in financial difficulty. De Grauwe (2012) 
claims that ESM has the same problem as SMP which had limited resources. When 
ESM buys bonds from secondary markets, it may give an incentive for the investors to 
sell their bonds because resources of EMS are limited. De Grauwe explains that 
situation is similar to the one described in the paper of Paul Krugman (1979), when 
central bank is trying to keep a fixed exchange rate with limited foreign reserves.  
Speculators know that central banks foreign reserves are limited so they sell before the 
reserves end. Greene (2012) thinks that in the case of ESM, it may be possible that 
creditors benefit more than debtor due to the limited resources. In addition to the limited 
                                                 
18 Securities Market Program was a bond puchasing program used by ECB. It was replaced by OMT in  
2012. 
 
19 European Stabilization Mechanism is an organization which provides financial assistance to euro zone  
member countries in financial difficulties. All euro zone countries are members of EMS 
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capacity, ESM carries a special feature compared to OMT: its debt is senior. 
 
Steinkamp and Westermann (2012) argue that the share of senior lenders has been 
important in explaining the part of bond spreads which can`t be explained by fiscal 
fundamentals. They find evidence that large residuals in the paper of De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012) can be reduced by adding their proxy variable for senior lending tranche. 
Seniority means that there are lenders in a better position than others i.e. in the case of 
default, the senior lenders will get their payment first. However, the amount of senior 
debt is unlikely to affect bond yields of euro countries like Finland and Germany since 
they haven`t needed any rescue package. 
 
The several policy steps taken to ease the European debt crisis seem to have affected 
individual euro countries differently. For example, the decisions related to ESM seemed 
to raise bond yield of Germany but had no effect on Spain`s yield. These kind of 
decisions may increase risk in some countries and decrease it in other countries. 
Especially an announcement of financial support package may be seen as risk sharing 
between countries and thus raising bond yields in countries with solid fiscal 
fundamentals such as Germany and Finland. (Kilponen et al. 2012). Attianasi et al. 
(2009) find that the announcements of rescue packages have led to reassessment of 
credit risk mainly due to transfer of risk from private sector to government. 
4  Theoretical approach 
4.1  Bond yield spread 
I use a standard definition of bond risk which is determined by credit risk (default risk), 
liquidity risk and risk appetite (see, for example, Bellas et al. 2010 and Beirne and 
Fratzscher 2012). Assuming that the investors are risk averse, the relationship between 
risk free and risky bond can be written as: 
 
1.                                       
 
Where,       is probability of no default,           is probability of default,    yield 
in a risky bond,    yield in a risk free bond,   recovery rate in case of default
20
,     risk 
                                                 
20 Recovery rate of 0 means that all the money invested in a bond is lost in a case of default. 
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aversion premium and    liquidity premium. Equation 1 can be solved to approximate a 
bond yield spread    of risky and risk free bond (          ) by assuming    
       and    are small. Solving for the spread, we get:  
 
2.                         
 
4.2  Relationship between government budget constraint and debt 
To understand the link between credit risk and government debt, it is useful to write 
government annual budget constraint as follows (for example, Contessi 2012 and ECB 
2011a): 
 
3.                                  
 
Where,   is government spending,        interest on outstanding debt,    tax income, 
          net borrowing and           change in money stock. I assume that 
government can finance its expenditures (left-handside) by taxes, issuing new debt or 
changing money stock (Seigniorage). Let`s define primary balance as        and 
solve the equation for    (debt at the end of period t): 
 
4.                    
 
Let`s divide equation by nominal GDP        to get Debt to GDP ratio   : 
 
5. 
  
    
 
          
    
 
  
    
 
   
    
 
 
6.    
      
            
            
 
In equation 6, I have used the known approximation and decomposed nominal growth 
rate of GDP component
21
 into growth component       and price component      
where     is real GDP growth rate and    inflation rate. Nominal interest rate 
                                                 
21                    ) where     is nominal growth rate of GDP. Similar to Fisher equation. 
12 
 
component can be written as the Fisher equation:                     where 
  is real interest rate. Plugging it into equation 6: 
 
7.    
      
      
            
 
The Dept to GDP ratio depends on real interest rate, real GDP growth rate, primary 
balance and seigniorage. If interest rate exceeds the GDP growth rate, then the debt 
accumulates unless budget surplus or seigniorage will fill the gap. Next, I get the 
change in government Debt to GDP ratio by subtracting      from both sides: 
 
8.     
     
    
            
 
The primary budget level where debt is stabilized        : 
 
9.    
     
    
         
 
Seigniorage is an option for a government with own currency like Sweden to reduce 
debt to GDP level without primary budget surplus. Reinhard and Sbrancia (2011) 
estimate that Sweden benefited from negative real interest rate
22
, for most of the time, 
during 1947-1965. Also low nominal interest rates helped to reduce debt servicing costs. 
Debt to GDP percent dropped from 52% in 1945 to 29.6% in 1955. The authors estimate 
that debt to GDP percent would have been 59.1% in 1955 without ”financial 
repression
23”. Annual inflation in 1946-1955 averaged 5 %.  Also countries such as 
United States, UK, Australia, Belgium and Italy inflated their debt, for example, US 
reduced debt to GDP percent from 116% to 66.2% during 1945-1955. The authors argue 
that inflation is the most effective way in debt liquidating, when interest rates can`t 
response to rise in inflation or in inflation expectations, for example, when interest rates 
are predetermined or administered (Financial repression). 
                                                 
22Real value of government debt falls with negative real interest rates. 
 
23Financial repression means all the measures taken by which government channels funds  
to themselves. For example, directed lending to government, caps on interest rates,  
increased association between banks and government (See, for example, Reinhard and  
Sbrancia 2011) 
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5  Measuring theoretical determinants 
5.1  Measuring credit risk 
Credit risk is commonly measured by variables which explain country`s fiscal situation 
such as Debt to GDP ratio, Deficit to GDP ratio, credit ratings, Current account balance 
to GDP ratio and real GDP growth rate. Also measures for: competitiveness, political 
stability, size of the banking sector, inflation and default history have been used. Widely 
used “contagion” can also be included into credit risk category as a bad fiscal situation, 
for example, in Russia is likely to affect on a current account of a country like Finland, 
and thus its ability to pay back its debt. 
 
Investors make investment decisions on government bonds using all the information 
they have at the time of buying a bond. This information includes past, present and 
future so investors use also expected future values (especially regarding the credit risk 
components mentioned above) in determining the bond`s current value. Using expected 
values is common in literature but the lack of decent high frequency data is a problem. 
Although actual country data suffers from the same problem, it is still better available. 
Credit ratings are considered to carry the necessary information of the countries credit 
worthiness and are found good in explaining bond spreads (see, for example, De Santis 
2012). However, using credit ratings of Finland and Sweden wouldn`t give much 
information because of the stability of ratings for the two countries. 
 
5.2  Measuring risk aversion 
Risk aversion component is the amount of compensation that investors require to buy a 
risky bond, so when expected bond yield (determined by default probability i.e. fiscal 
fundamentals) of risky bond equals risk free yield, a risk averse investor wants higher 
yield to become indifferent between the bonds. In equation 1 the investor requires also 
liquidity premium in addition to risk aversion premium. 
 
Risk aversion is generally proxied by VIX-index which measures the expected volatility 
in US stock market`s for next 30-days. Other measures are also used, such as BBB-
spreads
24
, KFW-bond spreads, Swap spreads, iTraxx-Europe.index and VSTOXX-
                                                 
24BBB-spread is a yield spread between low grade US corporate bonds and US government bonds. Also  
AAA-spreads (for example, Attinasi 2009) and High yield-spreads (for example, MacGuire 2003) are  
used to measure risk aversion. 
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index. However, the latter two haven`t got much support from empirical studies (see, for 
example, Kilponen et al. 2012). Swap spreads also carry a problem because in the fall 
2008 they plunged while other risk indicators displayed record levels (Gerlach et al. 
2010). Schuknecht et al. (2010) find that BBB-spread was an important factor in 
explaining euro countries bond spreads. The authors suggest that without a rise in BBB-
spread (a rise in risk aversion) in the beginning of the crisis, would Finland-Germany 
bond spread have decreased as financial markets started to discriminate more based on 
countries fiscal fundamentals (Wake-up call). McGuire et al. (2013) use BBB-spread 
and VIX among other risk aversion measures and find risk aversion as an important 
factor in explaining spreads of 15 emerging economies
25
. De Santis (2012) points out, 
that BBB-spread and VIX-index move together with KFW-bond spread until the end of 
2009, and only the latter rises in 2010 when peripheral euro economies spreads continue 
to rise. He finds that KFW-bond spread is the single most important factor explaining 
spreads between Finland and Germany. KFW-bond spread should in theory measure 
only the liquidity preference. However, as suggested by De Santis, higher KFW-bond 
spread during crisis tells that there has been flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality 
towards German bonds i.e. investors wanted liquid and safe assets, and thus used 
German bond as a safe haven. 
 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) try to explain what causes the change in risk aversion 
and find positive connection between short-term interest rates and bond spreads. They 
suggest this could be due the risk aversion. For example, in line with Rajan (2005), 
investment managers are more willing to take risk when interest rates are low in order to 
improve the expected return of their investment. When interest rates are higher 
investment managers may get the sufficient return by investing in safe assets.  The 
authors also explain that since risk aversion is commonly higher in economic 
slowdowns, it could be that tighter monetary policy signals for upcoming fall in real 
activity and future consumption which increases risk aversion and bond spreads. 
Attinasi et al. (2009) find a link between ECB`s monetary policy and bonds spreads 
during 2007-2009 and interpret it as risk aversion, similarly to Manganelli and 
Wolswijk. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
25 The authors find that a single common factor (interpreted as risk aversion) accounts for 80% of the 
common variation which explains one third of the total daily movement in each spread of 15 emerging 
economies. 
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5.3  Measuring liquidity 
Liquidity is suggested to play a role in debt yields because higher liquidity is likely to 
guarantee better price for a bond if sold before maturity. Bid-ask rates for bonds are 
commonly used for measuring liquidity because higher bid-ask rates are considered to 
correspond lower liquidity. Favero et al. (2007) suggest that smaller debt markets (lower 
liquidity) may play a role in bond spreads by increasing them. Attinasi et al. (2009) find 
that size of the government debt markets relative to Germany affects bond yields, for 
example, they estimate that up to 43% of the spread of France`s bond can be explained 
by their liquidity proxy.  Also Bernoth et al. (2004) and Giordano et al. (2012) find the 
size of the government bond markets as important determinant of bond spreads in euro 
area. Gómez-Puig (2006) find that both bid-ask rates and size of government bond 
markets explained bond spread differences in EMU. In contrast, Codogno et al. (2003) 
don`t find liquidity as an important factor in euro area. The authors find liquidity 
significant for Finland-Germany bond spread but its effect is small. They use three 
measures for liquidity: bid-ask rates, trading volume and turnover ratio, and find trading 
volume as the most important indicator of liquidity. More recent studies find liquidity as 
an important determinant for Finland-Germany spread, for example, De Santis (2013), 
Favero and Missale (2012) and Haugh et al. (2009). In this thesis, I will use the relative 
size of government bond markets as a measure for liquidity. If Sweden has more bonds 
on the market relative to Finland one could argue that Sweden bonds are more liquid as 
its bond markets are bigger. 
 
In addition to credit risk, risk aversion and liquidity, and in line with Poghosyan (2012), 
I take inflation into account. Inflation is discussed more in the next Data section. 
6  Data 
 
In the basic models, I use current values i.e. actual values and not forecasted values of 
the variables. I use forecasted values only in the special models. The data for basic- and 
special models is in monthly values. One model utilizes daily bond spread- and VIX-
index data.  
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The study uses mainly monthly data, and because most of the data is published only in 
yearly aggregates, the linear interpolation
26
 is used to derive monthly values. The 
explanatory variables of the basic models are: Germany`s 10-year bond yield, Expected 
exchange rate, Inflation, VIX-index, Debt to GDP, Deficit to GDP, GDP growth rate, 
Current account balance to GDP, Real effective exchange rate and Liquidity. I have used 
subtraction- or dividing method to get the last six variable to reflect country differences, 
which method is used and how, is explained in the detailed description of each variable 
below
27
. Linear interpolation is used to get monthly values for Debt to GDP, Deficit to 
GDP, GDP growth rate and Current account balance to GDP. 
 
In the special models, I use forecasted values from European commission`s Spring and 
Autumn forecasts. Forecasted values are: GDP growth rate, Current account balance to 
GDP, Deficit to GDP and Inflation (Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) for 
the euro area). For each variable, I have two values per year so the linear interpolation is 
used to get monthly values. The expected coefficient signs for the variables are the same 
as those for the normal variables described below. 
6.1  Government bond yield   
The 10-year government bond yield data for Sweden and Finland is in monthly averages 
and is collected from Riksbank and Bank of Finland, respectively. The monthly 10-year 
government bond yield data for Germany is collected from Riksbank. Bond spread of 
Finland and Sweden for each month is calculated by subtracting Sweden`s monthly 
bond yield value from corresponding Finland`s bond yield value. The daily bond yield 
data for Finland and Sweden comes from Riksbank.  
6.2  Expected exchange rate 
The expected exchange rate variable is constructed by subtracting Sweden`s 6-month t-
bill (treasury bill) yield at time t from corresponding Germany`s value. The idea is to 
rely on Uncovered Interest Rate Parity-theorem, so that the expected change in 
exchange rate is based solely on interest rate differential. For example, if t-bill yield is 
                                                 
26 Linear interpolation is used to fill the holes in data. For example, monthly values between two yearly 
published values can be derived by using linear interpolation. Linear interpolation simply fits a linear line 
between two observed values and calculates the missing values. It should be emphasized that linear 
interpolation does not give any extra information about the variables. This method is previously used, for 
example, by Barrios et.al (2009) and Arslanalp and Poghosyan (2014) and Gibson et al (2011). 
 
27 Dividing method can`t be used for deriving certain variables. For example, Current account balance to 
GDP for both countries can be negative and would thus yield to the same variable value as when the 
values were positive i.e. Finland`s value -3% and Sweden`s values -2% yields the variable value of 1.5 (-
3% /- 2%) which is the same as if Finland`s value is 3% and Sweden`s value 2%.  
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higher in Germany, the euro is expected to depreciate. The variable is expected to have 
positive coefficient sign because higher Germany`s rate tells that euro is expected to 
depreciate and thus higher yield is demanded on Finland`s bonds. The variable and 
Finland-Sweden bond spread is depicted in figure 13 (appendix). Source of the data: 
Bundesbank (Germany data) and Riksbank (Sweden data) 
6.3  Inflation 
Inflation variable is calculated by subtracting Sweden`s inflation at time t from 
Finland`s inflation at time t. The expected sign of the coefficient is positive because: 
1.Higher euro area inflation decreases real yields of the bonds, and thus the investors 
demand for higher yields to get equal real yields between the countries. 2. Higher 
inflation may signal the investors that ECB is going to raise interest rates soon, which 
would lead to higher bond yields
28
. 3. According to the Purchasing Power Parity 
theory
29
, a country with higher inflation should experience a currency depreciation, 
which should increase bond yields as the investors are expecting euro to depreciate 
against krona. For more, see: Alexopolou et al. (2009). It is important to note that I use 
Consumer Price Index data for the basic models, and Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices for the special models (using forecasted values)
30
. Source of the data: Consumer 
price index (OECD) and Harmonized index of consumer prices (European 
Commission). 
6.4  Credit risk variables: Debt to GDP, Deficit to GDP, GDP growth rate, Current 
account balance to GDP and Real effective exchange rate 
 
Debt to GDP 
Debt to GDP variable takes on values of Finland`s government Debt to GDP ratio and 
Sweden`s government Debt to GDP ratio. The variable is constructed by dividing 
Finland`s value at time t by Sweden`s value at time t. The coefficient of the variable is 
expected to be positive i.e. “spread increasing”, because higher variable value means 
                                                 
28 ECB`s interest rate raise would raise the market rates and thus the “risk free” rate in bond pricing 
theory would rise.  
 
29 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a concept which states that an exchange rate between two countries 
should adjust so that prices of goods measured in a same currency are equal. For example, if a hamburger 
costs 10 euro in country A and 15 USD in country B, the PPP holds if one euro can buy 1.5 USD. For 
more detailed description of PPP, see, for example, Lafrance and Schembri 2002.   
 
30 CPI and HICP are calculated in a different way so forecasted inflation values in this paper are not those 
of Consumer Price Index. Also HCIP values are for euro area and Sweden, and not for Finland and 
Sweden as in the CPI-data. This is because the euro are inflation rates weren`t available from 1995. 
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that Finland has relatively higher amount of future debt liabilities to GDP, compared to 
a lower variable value. The variable is plotted with Finland-Sweden bond spread in 
figure 1. Source of the data: Eurostat.  
 
Deficit to GDP 
Deficit to GDP variable is constructed by subtracting Sweden`s Deficit to GDP ratio at 
time t from Finland`s Deficit to GDP ratio at time t. Government surplus takes on 
positive values and deficit negative values. The coefficient of the variable is expected to 
be negative as Finland`s higher Deficit to GDP ratio would give it a possibility to pay 
off debt thus reducing its Debt to GDP ratio. Source of the data: Countryeconomy and 
European Commission (forecasts). 
 
GDP growth rate 
GDP growth rate variable is calculated by subtracting Sweden`s monthly GDP growth 
rate at time t from Finland`s corresponding growth rate. The sign of the variable`s 
coefficient is expected to be negative because Finland`s higher GDP growth rate is 
likely to give investors a signal that the economy is in better shape and tax income is 
likely to rise while public expenditures fall. Source of the data: OECD and European 
Commission (forecasts).  
 
Current account balance to GDP 
Current account balance to GDP variable is calculated by subtracting Sweden`s monthly 
Current account balance to GDP ratio at time t from corresponding value of Finland. 
The sign of the variable`s coefficient is expected to be negative as positive variable 
value would imply that Finland`s foreign trade is relatively in better shape. Source of 
the data: OECD and European Commission (forecasts). 
 
Real effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate variable is constructed by subtracting Sweden`s monthly 
real effective exchange rate value at time t from corresponding value of Finland. 
Expected sign of the coefficient is positive because positive variable value can be 
interpreted as a sign of weaker competitiveness of Finland. Source of the data: World 
Bank. 
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6.5  Risk aversion variable: VIX-index 
VIX-index is utilized to capture the possible risk aversion effects on yields. Expected 
sign of the coefficient is positive based on the fact that Sweden has its own central bank, 
which shows itself as the lender of last resort. The same reasoning applies also for the 
pre-euro period 1995-1998, when Finland still had its own monetary policy, since 
investors were likely expecting that Finland will be chosen to the third stage of EMU 
and thus giving up its own monetary policy. Source of the data: Yahoo finance.  
6.6  Liquidity variable: Bond market size 
Liquidity variable consists of relative bond market sizes of the countries 
(Sweden/Finland). Bond market size of a country is the monetary sum of its long term 
bonds
31
. Country with larger bond market is likely to have better liquidity as there are 
more available bonds to trade. The coefficient of the variable is assumed to be positive 
because investors are likely to prefer bond markets with better liquidity, so an increase 
in the variable value should lead to an increase in the spread. If the investor has to sell a 
bond before maturity, he probably gets a better price when there are more buyers in the 
markets. The data for Sweden is originally in krona so I have calculated the 
corresponding euro values using timely corresponding exchange rates. Source of the 
data: Valtiokonttori and Statistics Sweden.  
7  Models 
7.1  Models for the period 1995-2013 
I use the dynamic OLS to estimate the coefficients of the independent variables. The 
reason for this is that the dependent Spread variable is trending, which leads to large 
autocorrelation of the error terms and problems of spurious regression. To reduce 
autocorrelation, I add a lagged Spread variable as an explanatory variable. If 
autocorrelation exists after the adding of lagged dependent variable, the Newey-West 
standard errors are used. This also takes care of the potential unit root-problem which 
arises from the possible non-stationarity of the Spread variable
32
 (see, figure 1). I test 
                                                 
31 Bonds with maturity over 1 year are considered as long term bonds (Valtiokonttori). 
 
32 Also De Santis (2012) noticed potential unit root-problems in different countries bond spreads and 
explanatory variables. 
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autocorrelation with Breusch-Godfrey test (BG-test) with orders up to 1-5, I also look 
for the autocorrelation function plot. 
 
 I use different model specification to test how different explanatory variable 
combinations work. As I have many variables for measuring the credit risk, there may 
appear multicollinearity. For example, the Liquidity variable may be multicollinear with 
the Debt to GDP variable, due to the similarity in their structure. To take the possible 
multicollinearity into account, I start with a simple model specification, and add 
variables carefully. I leave out the Expected exchange rate variable from the first four 
models so that we can see how the models perform with and without it.  
 
The model specification that contains all the variables is constructed as follows:  
 
10.                                                    
                       
 
Where:    is Finland-Sweden bond spread,     is constant,     is Debt to GDP variable, 
    is Deficit to GDP variable,     is GDP growth rate variable,     is Current account 
balance to GDP variable,     is the Real effective exchange rate variable,    is VIX-
index variable,    is Liquidity variable,   is Germany 10-year bond yield variable,   
is Inflation variable,    is Expected exchange rate variable.      is lagged dependent 
variable and    is error term. From now on, the variables are called: Debtgdp (  ), 
Deficitgdp (  ),Growthr (  ), CA (  ), REER (  ), VIX   (  ), Liquidity (  ), G (  ), 
Inflation (  ), EEXR (  ) and Lagspread (    ). 
 
Although I have added the lagged dependent variable into each of the models, the BG-
test rejects the null hypothesis (no-autocorrelation) every time. I use Newey-West 
standard errors with automatic lag-selection criteria to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (Newey-West 1994).  
 
In the first model, model 1, I use Debtgdp, Deficitgdp, Growthr, Liquidity, VIX, G, 
Inflation and REER as the explanatory variables. The results are presented at table 1. 
Growth rate variable is statistically significant at 10% significance level. However, the 
coefficient sign is positive and thus not as expected.  
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After testing several models with Debt to GDP variable, I decided to remove it and use 
Deficit to GDP variable instead. The main reason for this is that Debt to GDP- and 
Deficit to GDP variables are likely multicollinear
33
. Also the potential multicollinearity 
with Liquidity variable is no longer a problem. In addition, Debt to GDP variable had 
constantly the wrong (negative) coefficient sign.  
 
In model 2, I use Deficitgdp, Growthr, Liquidity, VIX, G, Inflation, REER and CA as 
the explanatory variables. The results show that Growthr is still significant at 10% level 
but with the wrong sign. Also CA, Deficitgdp and Liquidity do not have the expected 
signs. In model 3, I leave out Inflation and CA to show the only model specification 
which has a significant variable at 5% significance level. Now, Deficitgdp is significant 
at 5% significance level, however, it is not a very robust result as adding inflation or 
CA, or taking off G or Growthr, drops deficitgdp out of the 5% significance level.  
 
To model 4, I add back CA, and drop out Growthr and Liquidity because the wrong 
expected coefficient signs are persistent for both. The results show that there are no 
significant variables. To model 5, I add the Expected exchange rate variable (EEXR) as 
explanatory variable. The results show that CA is significant at 10% significance level. 
To model 6, I add Inflation, and CA becomes significant at 5% significance level. 
However, after dropping out G, CA becomes not significant. Pearson`s correlation 
coefficient for G and CA is 0.78 which suggest quite strong positive correlation, 
although Germany`s 10-year bond yield and Finland`s current account balance should 
not have any apparent relationship
34
. 
 
I think that the lack of real data points is one serious problem in the models. The linear 
interpolation is used for four variables (CA, Debtgdp, Deficitgdp, Growthr) so there are 
only 18 real data points for each of those variables. This problem is hard to get over 
with as higher frequency data is not available. The problem for this kind of single-
country study is also addressed by Poghosyan (2012). However, later in this paper I try 
to improve models by using forecasted values (forecast data contains two real data 
points per year). Second problem is the time period studied. If we look at the figure 2, 
                                                 
33 In theory, government budget deficit increases public debt and surplus decreases it. However, having a 
budget surplus doesn`t automatically mean that government is using it for debt reduction. 
 
34 If there was a relationship between the two, it would likely be a negative one as higher Germany`s bond 
yield could imply that Germany`s economy is getting worse, which would then decrease the current 
account balance of Finland because Germany is an important trade partner for Finland. 
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we can see how bond yields behave differently before the EMU, before the crisis and 
during the crisis (see also: Beirne and Fratzscher 2012) This problem can be addressed 
by estimating models for different time periods.  
 
According to the models 1-6 results, there are no statistically significant determinants of 
the spread. Aside from the real data points problem, the results should not be too 
surprising as even Greece`s bond yield moved tightly together with Germany`s bond 
yield although the fiscal fundamentals were very different. De Grauwe (2012) and 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2012) suggest that financial markets have neglected fiscal 
fundamentals before the start of the crisis. Figure 2 depicts the way the EMU countries 
bonds were priced after the start of the EMU membership. The bonds seem to be priced 
as in one big EMU country, so country specific fundamentals were probably not 
important until from the start of euro crisis in the late 2007.  
 
 
Figure 2. Euro area 10-year bond yields. Time period 01/1995-12/2013. Source: ECB 
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Table 1: Results from the models 1-6 (NW-standard errors) 
 
Dependent variable: Spread 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VIX 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Debtgdp -0.044 
     
 
(0.079) 
     
Deficitgdp -0.011 -0.009 -0.016** -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Growthr 0.032* 0.035* 0.030 
   
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
   
Liquidity -0.061 -0.057 -0.070* 
   
 
(0.045) (0.052) (0.041) 
   
REER 0.779 0.856 0.251 -0.006 -0.021 0.312 
 
(0.560) (0.580) (0.343) (0.163) (0.188) (0.350) 
Inflation 0.037 0.038 
   
0.027 
 
(0.028) (0.027) 
   
(0.020) 
CA 
 
0.002 
 
-0.011 -0.049* -0.056** 
  
(0.037) 
 
(0.042) (0.029) (0.028) 
EEXR 
    
0.039 0.035 
     
(0.031) (0.029) 
G 
  
0.011 -0.003 0.003 0.006 
   
(0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) 
lag(Spread, 1) 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.882*** 0.948*** 0.858*** 0.833*** 
 
(0.078) (0.077) (0.054) (0.024) (0.082) (0.091) 
Constant 0.147 0.099 0.071 -0.021 -0.047 -0.056 
 
(0.122) (0.085) (0.102) (0.065) (0.055) (0.054) 
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 
R2 0.950 0.950 0.948 0.946 0.949 0.950 
Adjusted R2 0.948 0.948 0.947 0.944 0.947 0.948 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1. Results from the models 1-6. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Period studied 01/1995-12/2003. 
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7.2  Pre-crisis and crisis models 
Next, I show the results from two different periods: pre-crisis and crisis. I decided to 
leave out REER-, GROWTH- and G variables from the rest of the models that I show. 
Main reason for this is the poor performance in the previous models and the potential 
multicollinearity problems.  
 
First, I study the pre-crisis period 01/1995-06/2007. The BG-test suggests 
autocorrelation so I use NW-standard errors. I decided to address the potential 
multicollinearity of Deficitgdp and CA, and I show results only when they are not in the 
same model
35
. The results of the models 7-10 are presented at table 2 (appendix). In 
model 7, I use Deficitgdp and VIX as the explanatory variables, and there are no 
significant variables. To model 8, I add EEXR and Inflation, and Inflation is significant 
at 1% significance level. It stays significant at 5% significance level after removing 
EEXR, but without VIX in the model, it`s no longer significant. To model 9, I change 
Deficitgdp to CA so that we can see how VIX, CA, EEXR and Inflation perform. Now, 
Inflation is significant at 10% significance level, and stays that way without VIX in the 
model. In the final model, model 10, I drop out EEXR, and Inflation becomes 
significant at 5% significance level.  
 
Next, I examine the crisis period 07/2007-12/2013. I form four models which are 
exactly the same as the models 7-10 for the pre-crisis period. The BG-test suggests 
autocorrelation for the models 11 and 14, so I use NW-standard errors for the models. At 
table 3 (appendix), I present the results of the models 11-14. In the first model, model 
11, the results suggests that VIX is significant at 1% significance level. In the second 
model, model 12, VIX and EEXR are significant at 5% significance level. Interestingly, 
the coefficient sign of EEXR is negative. This may depict the risk aversion effect that 
Germany has experienced (see, for example, De Santis 2012), so as Germany`s yield 
has decreased due to risk aversion, Finland`s yield has risen, stayed level or decreased 
(by lower speed). Model 13`s results show that again EEXR is significant at 5% 
significance level, but now VIX is no longer significant. CA is significant at 10% 
significance level but with wrong expected sign. In the last model, model 14, VIX 
becomes significant again. The results from the models 11-14 give some support for that 
                                                 
35 Small open economies like Finland and Sweden are strongly dependent on exports. In 2013, exports of 
goods and services (% of GDP) was 38.2% for Finland and 43.8% for Sweden (World bank 2015). 
Potential multicollinearity problem arises from the assumption that exports affect GDP, and GDP affects 
government budget balance.  
25 
 
risk aversion was behind the Finland-Sweden bond spread development during the crisis 
period. De Santis (2012) and Barrios et al. (2009) have suggested that risk aversion was 
the main reason for Finland-Germany bond spread developments during the crisis.  
 
In figure 3, EEXR is plotted with Finland-Sweden bond spread. From the figure we can 
see how the Germany-Sweden t-bill spread (GS-spread) moves roughly together with 
the Finland-Sweden spread (FS-spread) until the crisis period, starting in the late 2007. 
Since then, the GS-spread tends to move sharply down when the FS-spread moves 
sharply up. This suggests that the risk aversion could be one reason for the relatively 
large movements in FS-spread during the crisis period
36
. To study the role of risk 
aversion during the crisis more precisely, I form a new model and use weekly VIX- and 
Finland-Sweden bond spread data. 
 
Figure 3. Finland-Sweden 10-year bond spread and Expected exchange rate variable 
(EEXR). EEXR equals the spread of Germany`s and Sweden`s 6-month treasury bill 
yields. Time period 01/1995-12/2013. Source. Bundesbank and Riksbank. 
                                                 
36 According to De Santis (2012), the risk aversion benefited most the safe and liquid assets during the 
crisis. The sharp decline of EEXR in 2008 seems to be caused by a sharp increase in the demand of 
Germany`s t-bills, possibly due to the increased risk aversion.  
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7.3  Model with weekly data 
To examine more accurately the role of VIX-index (risk aversion) during the crisis 
period, I use weekly bond spread- and VIX-index data for the new regression model: 
model 15. The results are presented at table 3 (appendix). In this model, I regress the 
spread on VIX-index and a lag of the spread. I don’t include any other variables for two 
reasons: First, the weekly data is not available for common fiscal fundamentals such as 
Deficit to GDP ratio. Second, VIX-index is a measure of expected US stock market 
volatility so it should not bear any omitted variable bias stemming from slowly evolving 
country specific fiscal fundamentals. BG-test p-value suggest autocorrelation so I use 
NW-standard errors. The results show a strong relationship (significant at 1% 
significance level) between the spread and VIX-index. I also run the same model with 
daily data, and interestingly the coefficient (significant at 1% significance level) of VIX 
comes down from 0.002 to 0.001.  
7.4  Models with forecast data 
Next, I form models using forecasts of Growth rate, Deficit to GDP- and Current 
account to GDP ratio. The data is not available for the whole period 1995-2013 so I 
study the period 2002-2013 instead. In addition to the benefits of more real data 
points
37
, the forecasted values may also depict better the information that the investors 
are using for decision making (see, for example, Laubach 2003 and Poghosyan 2012). I 
study the full period 2002-2013 and also two subperiods (01/2002-06/2007 and 
07/2007-12/2013). For each period, I show results from the same four model 
specifications: 1) VIX and DeficitgdpF. 2)  VIX, DeficitgdpF, EEXR, Inflation. 3) VIX, 
CAF (Current account variable), EEXR, Inflation. 4) VIX, CAF, Inflation.  
 
First, I discuss about the results from the period 01/2002-12/2013. The results from the 
models 16-19 are presented at table 4 (appendix). I have used Newey-West standard 
errors as BG-test suggested autocorrelation. The only statistically significant variable 
(5% significance level) is Inflation in model 16. The results may give some information 
about the role of country specific fiscal fundamentals during 2002-2013 i.e. fiscal 
fundamentals were likely not important during the period. However, again it`s important 
to remember the potential different pricing behavior in pre-crisis- and crisis period 
                                                 
37 Forecast data has two observations per year compared to one per year when the actual values were used 
for Current account balance to GDP, Growth rate to GDP and Deficit to GDP. 
27 
 
which may bias the results. Also the limitation of real data points is good to bear in 
mind. 
 
Next, I go through the results from the models 20-23 (period 01/2002-06/2007). The 
results are presented at table 5 (appendix). I have used normal standard errors for all 
models as BG-test didn`t suggest autocorrelation. Inflation is statistically significant in 
all model specifications where it has been included, however, the coefficient sign is 
negative. EEXR is statistically significant in model 22 but not in the model 23. VIX-
index is statistically significant in the models 20 and 23 but has the wrong coefficient 
sign. CAF is statistically significant at 5% significance level in the model 23 but not in 
the model 22.  It seems that there is still no support for the role of the fiscal 
fundamentals.  
 
Finally, I present the results from the period 07/2007-12/2013. The results from the 
models 24-27 are presented at table 5 (appendix). I have used normal standard errors for 
models 25-27. NW-standard errors are used for model 24 because BG-test suggested 
autocorrelation. The model specifications here are similar to those of the models 11-14. 
The difference is the use of forecasted values instead of the actual values
38
. This makes 
a careful comparison between the models possible. 
 
VIX-index is statistically significant in the first two models. These results are slightly 
different to those of the models 11-14 (table 3, appendix) when VIX was significant in 
three out of the four model specifications. The results for EEXR stayed similar so the 
coefficient was statistically significant but with the negative sign. Now, the Current-
account balance variable (CAF) is statistically significant but the coefficient sign is 
wrong. Using the forecasted values does not seem to change the significance of EEXR 
and VIX notably during the crisis period.  
 
To summarize the results from the models 16-27, it seems that in the pre-crisis period 
the models didn`t have any robust
39
 statistically significant variables, and during the 
                                                 
38 However, as described in the data section, the Inflation variable in the models 11-14 consists of 
Finland-Sweden CPI-values, and Inflation forecast variable consists of euro area-Sweden forecasted 
HICP-values, so the forecasted values are not those made for Inflation variable in the models 11-14. 
 
39 Statistically significant variables had either wrong expected coefficient sign or they became 
insignificant after adding/dropping variables that shouldn’t matter to them in theory. 
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crisis, VIX and EEXR  may have played a role. However, VIX was not statistically 
significant in two out of the four crisis period models. VIX tends to become 
insignificant when CAF is added to the model. Because CAF is significant with the 
wrong coefficient sign, it may well be that the lack of real data points of CAF is the 
reason for the results.  
7.5  Summary of the results 
Potentially important determinants of Finland-Sweden bond spread 
Period: 
01/1995-12/2013: No important determinants  
01/1995-06/2007: Inflation (+ coeff. sign) 
01/2002-12/2013:  No important determinants 
01/2002-06/2007: Inflation forecast (- coeff. sign) & EEXR (+ coeff. sign)  
07/2007-12/2013: VIX-index (+ coeff. sign) & EEXR (- coeff. sign) 
 
Inflation (01/1995-06/2007 & 01/2002-06/2007) 
Inflation may have affected the spread during 01/1995-06/2007 but the different 
coefficient signs of Inflation and Inflation forecast (InflationF) are confusing. Inflation 
stays statistically significant (positive coeff.) when I replace Inflation forecast with it in 
models 20-23 (period 01/2002-06/2007). I also test models 20-23 with a new inflation 
variable consisting of differences of the actual HICP-values between euro area and 
Sweden. Now, the new Inflation variable has positive coefficient sign but it`s 
statistically significant (10 % significance level) only in one model specification. 
Intuitively, the inflation in euro area should matter more than the inflation in Finland 
because of the theoretical relationships between inflation and bond yields. For example, 
the Purchasing Power Parity theory takes account euro area inflation rather than the 
inflation of a small country like Finland. Taken all the results together, I think that there 
is not enough statistical support for considering inflation as an important determinant of 
Finland-Sweden bond spread.  
 
EEXR (01/2002-06/2007) 
EEXR variable has got some statistical support from the model 21, but there is not 
enough statistical support for stating it as an important determinant of Finland-Sweden 
bond spread. However, from the figure 13 (appendix), we can see that there is probably 
some kind of relationship between the two before the crisis. It seems that when the t-bill 
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spread of Germany and Sweden (EEXR) turns positive, then the Finland-Sweden bond 
spread turns positive as well. In figure 14 (appendix), where I have plotted Germany-
Sweden 10-year bond spread and EEXR, we can see that similar pattern is visible before 
the crisis. Also Germany-Sweden 10-year bond spread development looks similar to the 
Finland-Sweden spread developments before the crisis i.e. there is an upward trend for 
both before the crisis. This suggests that rather than country specific fiscal 
fundamentals, the euro area specific yield requirements such as exchange rate 
expectations may have been important. Also convergence in bond yields across 
countries may have happened. That would partly explain the pre-crisis developments in 
the Finland-Sweden- and Germany-Sweden bond spreads i.e. bond yields have become 
closer together just like happened in euro area
40
. The possible convergence is discussed 
more in the plot analysis section 8.4. 
 
VIX-index and EEXR (07/2007-12/2013) 
The results suggest that the only important determinants during 07/2007-12/2013 where 
VIX-index and EEXR. Interestingly, EEXR had the wrong expected coefficient sign 
which may have been caused by the increased risk aversion. Also VIX-index is a 
measure of risk aversion so these two results taken together, it seems that the increased 
risk aversion may have been behind the Finland-Sweden spread developments during 
the crisis period. This result is similar to what previous studies have found as the reason 
for Finland-Germany bond spread developments during the crisis (see, for example, De 
Santis 2012, Schuknecht et al. 2010).  
 
To sum up the results from the regression analysis, the VIX-index (during the crisis) is 
the only statistically significant variable which has the correct expected coefficient sign. 
Also VIX-index stays statistically significant in most of the model specifications. It only 
becomes insignificant in few models when a linearly interpolated variable such as CAF 
has been added into the model. Linearly interpolated variables seem to have caused 
problems in the study, so for a single-country study like this, it`s important to address 
the lack of data for fiscal fundamentals. As suggested by Poghosyan (2012): although a 
single-country study enables for more country specific results, it suffers from the lack of 
                                                 
40 Convergence of bond yields in euro area during EMU period is supported by studies such as Ehrmann 
(2007) and Beirne and Fratzscher (2012).  See, also figure 2.  
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data. It is thus understandable why the majority of the studies regarding bond spreads 
are done by using panel data.  
 
8  Plot analysis 
 
In 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, I represent plots of daily bond spreads (Finland-Sweden- and 
Germany-Sweden bond spreads), special events and VIX-index from the crisis period 
02.07.2007-30.12.2013. The aim is to see whether there are any strong reactions in 
spreads after a certain event. The period is divided into two subperiods so that the plots 
are clearer and easier to follow. First, I go through the special events and reaction of 
Finland-Sweden- and Germany-Sweden bond spread for the period 02.07.2007-
01.07.2010. After this, the period 02.07.2010-30.12.2013 is analyzed in a similar way.   
 
In 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, I go briefly through plots regarding OMT, Risk aversion and 
Convergence of bond yields, respectively.  
8.1  Finland-Sweden bond yield spread and special events during 02.07.2007-
30.12.2013 
8.1.1  Period 02.07.2007-01.07.2010 
Main events: 
09.08.2007 BNP-Paribas: BNP-Paribas was the first major bank to freeze certain funds 
related to subprime-mortgage markets. At the same time BNP-Paribas gave implicitly 
information about the riskiness of subprime related investments. The bank claimed that 
the subprime-mortgage markets related assets were too hard to value and that the 
liquidity was missing in those markets. (Kingsley 2012, NYtimes 2007, Boyd 2007). 
 
15.09.2008 The collapse of Lehman brothers: Lehman brothers was a large American 
bank that was strongly exposed to subprime mortgage markets, and collapsed causing a 
panic in financial markets (see, for example, Boyd 2007). 
 
08.10.2008 ECB`s  decrease of interest rates on the main refinancing operations from 
4.25 to 3.75: ECB decreases interest rate for the first time in the period studied. 
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17.02.2009 The recovery pack (ARRA): The US government stimulus packages of 
approximately 840$ billion consisting of spending and tax cuts. The congress passed the 
package on 13.02.2009 and it was four days later approved by the president. 
(Recory.gov 2015). 
 
10.05.2010 SMP: ECB announced The Securities Market Program to ensure depth and 
liquidity in dysfunctional private and public debt security markets. SMP purchased 
mainly government bonds on the secondary markets and was later replaced by OMT. 
(ECB 2010 and Bundesbank 2015). 
 
07.06.2010 EFSF: The European Financial Stability mechanism was a temporary crisis 
resolution mechanism guaranteed by the eurozone member countries. The member 
countries guaranteed EFSF:s loans so that it could borrow money to a member country 
in financial difficulties. EFSF was later followed by ESM. (EFSF 2015). 
 
Figure 4. Finland-Sweden daily 10-year bond spread and VIX-index. Time period 
02.07.2007-01.07.2010. Source. Riksbank and Yahoo Finance. 
32 
 
 
Figure 5. Germany-Sweden daily 10-year bond spread and VIX-index. Time period 
02.07.2007-01.07.2010. Source. Riksbank and Yahoo Finance.  
 
Since the start of the crisis (BNP-Paribas), we can see how FS-spread is decreasing until 
the end of 2007, so the BNP-Paribas event didn`t apparently have any direct positive 
impact on the spread. There is clearly an upward pressure on FS-spread and GS-spread 
starting in April 2008, but it looks like that VIX-index didn`t move along until the 
collapse of Lehman brothers, so markets were likely fearing that something bad could 
happen, but the expected volatility in US stock markets (VIX-index) wasn`t noticeably 
affected. The collapse of Lehman brothers is clearly the starting point of the increased 
expected stock market volatility and the stock market slide in US and Europe. ECB 
responded to worsened economic outlook by decreasing its interest rate by 0.5 percent 
points to 3.75, however, this does not seem to have a long lasting downward impact on 
the spread. The announcement of ARRA may be one reason for the spread decline of FS 
and GS in 2009, as it seems that it`s the turning point when US stock markets bottomed 
and started to rise while also VIX-index declined. In the early 2010, FS-spread started 
its upward trend again, right after hitting the zero-line first time since April 2008. 
Upward trend stopped apparently due to the ECB announcements of SMP and EFSF. 
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Kilponen et al. (2012) found evidence that SMP announcement did have downward 
impact on some euro countries spreads. But as we can see next, the SMP and EFSF 
were supposedly not strong enough solutions for bond investors.  
8.1.2  Period 02.07.2010-30.12.2013 
Main events: 
28.10.2010 ESM first discussed: The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was 
discussed for the first time. ESM provides financial assistance to the euro area member 
states, and it replaced EFSF in 2013. The establishment of ESM required funds from 
euro members. (ESM 2015a). 
 
07.04.2011 ECB increases interest rate on the main refinancing operations: The first 
interest rate increase made in 02.07.2007-30.12.2013 by ECB. 
 
17.05.2011 Financial support for Portugal announced: Counsil of the European Union 
approved aid to Portugal. The aid of 78 billion came from EU, EFSM,ESFS and IMF. 
(Counsil 2011). 
 
23.11.2011 Germany`s bond auction fails: Germany was unable to sell approximately 
35% of its 10-year bonds in the bond auction. (Dopson 2011).  
 
08.12.2011 ECB announces LTRO:s: ECB decided to conduct two longer-term 
refinancing operations to euro area banks with a maturity of 36 months. LTRO:s are a 
way to provide liquidity to banks. (ECB 2011b). 
 
25.06.2012 Cyprus requests for financial support: Cuprys requested financial support 
from the president of the Eurogroup. (ESM 2015b). 
 
26.07.2012 Draghi`s speech “Whatever it takes”: ECB:s president Mario Draghi told in 
his speech that: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro”. The financial markets started to speculate whether the speech was a 
promise to start purchase government bonds of the euro countries more strongly. (Black, 
Randow 2012). 
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06.09.2012 OMT: The technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions were 
released. On the same day SMP was terminated. OMT was first discussed in 
02.08.2012. (ECB 2012). 
 
24.04. 2013 ESM board government approves financial support for Cuprys: Financial 
package for Cyprus was approved by the ESM board government. On 08.05.2013 the 
package was also approved by the directors of ESM. The package size was up to 10 
billion and financed by ESM (approx.9 billion) and IMF (1 billion). (ESM 2015b). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Finland-Sweden daily 10-year bond spread and VIX-index. Time period 
02.07.2010-30.12.2013. Source. Riksbank and Yahoo Finance. 
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Figure 7. Germany-Sweden daily 10-year bond spread and VIX-index. Time period 
02.07.2010-30.12.2013. Source. Riksbank and Yahoo Finance. 
 
After the SMP and ESFS announcements, the next important announcement was the 
ESM. The ESM meant that the liabilities for Finland and Germany were about to 
increase, but at the same time the stability of eurozone was supported by the new 
financial support providing program. It seems that the liability burden outweighed the 
benefits, and the bond spreads started to increase. The increase in the spreads was 
maybe magnified by the Portugal financial support package announcement. On 
17.05.2011, when Portugal financial support package was announced, FS-spread was 
0.265% and GS-spread 0.068%, and the day after the spreads were 0.352% and 0.164%, 
respectively. Although ECB interest rate increase, preceding Portugal financial support 
packages, was speculated to be the reason for FS-spread increase in 2011 by Paul 
Krugman (2011), the FS-spread does actually decrease in the next two trading days after 
the announcement, also the GS-spread decreases one day after the announcement. 
However, the effects from the interest rate increase may have come with a longer lag. 
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After the Portugal financial support announcement, FS-spread kept increasing, while 
also the VIX-index increased and stayed at higher levels. The bond spread 
developments in 2011 culminated in November, when Germany failed to sell part of its 
bonds. This led to sharp rises in bond yields in the eurozone as Germany is the largest 
economy in the EMU, and if it struggles in getting money from markets, the other 
member countries will struggle as well. The bond yield spike didn`t last long, for 
example, Finland`s bond yield was back at pre-Germany auction fail levels in a week. 
For Germany it took a bit longer, three weeks. After the Germany auction shock and 
ECB`s LOTR announcement, FS-spread started to decline sharply. Even The Cyprus 
financial support request did not have any clear short term impact on yields. The next 
event: Mario Draghi`s speech supposedly affected FS-spread in the short-term, as it 
came down from 0.241% on 25.07.2012 to 0.135% on 27.07.2012. Interestingly, the 
OMT announcement didn`t have such an immediate impact on FS-spread, although it 
seems to be the most significant event affecting all eurozone yields. On 05.09.2012, the 
day before the OMT announcement, FS-spread came up from previous days spread of 
0.134% to 0.38%, so financial markets were fearing the upcoming announcement. 
Although the OMT was announced, which basically meant that ECB will behave as the 
lender of last resort, the financial markets reacted with a lag and there wasn`t any 
sudden drop in FS-spread, but a steady persistent decline. The OMT has never been 
activated, so it seems that only the ECB`s dedication to behave in a lender of last resort-
manner, has been able to calm the financial markets
41
, and eurozone bonds are now 
priced in more similar way to developed countries, who have control over their own 
currency. 
8.2  OMT, Credit rating downgrade and bond yield spreads during 01/2002-
03/2015 
 
To see OMT:s possible contribution to Finland`s bond spread against Sweden and 
Germany more clearly, I use monthly data and plot the bond spreads from the period 
01/2002-03/2015. In figure 8, FS-spread and FG-spread (Finland-Germany bond 
spread) moved closely together during the crisis period, which should terminate any 
exchange rate-explanation for the two “humps” i.e. a possible change in exchange rate 
expectations seems not likely to explain the drastic spread movements during 2008-
2012. Although the FS-spread has turned negative after the OMT announcement, it`s 
                                                 
41 This was the scenario of Paul De Grauwe (2011) 
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noticeable how the GS-spread has stayed on higher levels compared to the pre-crisis. 
However, there seems to be some downward trend in the FG-spread, despite the credit 
rating downgrade of Standard & Poor’s in October 2014.  
 
In figure 9, it seem that after OMT, FS-spread is again moving as before the crisis 
(before BNP-Paribas) and starting to follow the t-bill spread of Germany and Sweden. 
Interestingly during the crisis, the t-bill spread started to move in opposite directions 
from the long term spreads. Even Germany-Sweden 10-year bond spread didn’t follow 
it. In 2008, GS-spread in figure 5 (GS-10-year bond spread) drastically increased while 
t-bill spread in figure 9 decreases. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Finland-Germany bond spread and Finland-Sweden bond spread. Time period 
01/2002-03/2015. Source. Riksbank. 
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Figure 9. Germany-Sweden 6-month treasury bill spread and Finland-Sweden 10-year 
bond spread. Time period 01/2002-03/2015. Vertical lines: BNP-paribas (left) & OMT 
(right). Source. Bundesbank and Riksbank. 
 
8.3  Risk aversion  
Some authors (Giordano.et al 2012 and Poghosyan 2012) suggest that European 
countries such as Finland, have benefited from risk aversion. To study whether this is 
true, I plot VIX-index and bond yields of three European countries with AAA-credit 
rating (Germany, Sweden, Finland) and countries with weaker fiscal fundamentals 
(Spain, Portugal, Italy). The idea is to see how Finland`s bond yield develops when 
VIX-index rises sharply. The rising bond spread of Finland and Sweden in the crisis 
period does not give us any information whether Finland`s yield is rising, decreasing or 
staying level, so we have to look how the yield itself behave. From the figure 10, we 
can see that when VIX-index gets large values of over 40, then at points A and B 
Sweden bond yield drops below Germany`s levels. Those points are also in the 
immediate vicinity when Finland`s bond spread against Germany and Sweden is on its 
highest levels. If we look closely to the bond spreads before events A and B, when VIX-
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index started its sharp climb, we can see that Finland`s bond yield follows Germany and 
Sweden in both cases, so Finland`s bond yield is decreasing. In addition to VIX-index, 
the risk aversion can be seen from the slopes of the AAA-countries yields, which are 
steepest right before points A and B. To see that this yield development is not just some 
common trend in euro area, I have also added bond yields of Spain, Portugal and Italy, 
to show how the yields in economically weaker European countries moved in the 
proximity of points A and B. Obviously, the dispersion between AAA-countries and 
other countries starts before point A, near the point when VIX-index starts to rise. After 
that, when VIX-index rises sharply again (point B), the yields moved strictly to other 
directions. Thus, one could speculate that Finland has benefited from the risk aversion, 
although Germany and Sweden have benefited more
42
.  
 
 
Figure 10. European 10-year bond yields and VIX-index. Time period 01/2007-12/2013. 
Source. ECB and Yahoo Finance. 
                                                 
42 Previous studies have found that Germany has benefited from risk aversion during the crisis period. 
(See, for example, De Santis 2012 and Schuknecht et al. 2010). 
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8.4  Convergence of bond yields  
It is plausible that the Finland-Sweden bond spread developments before the crisis were 
partly caused by the convergence of bond yields across countries. Without trying to find 
a reason for this possible convergence, I have plotted Finland`s, Germany`s, UK`s and 
Sweden`s bond yields in figure 11, just to show how all the bond yields (even Greece) 
start to closely co-move before the year 2002.  
 
Finland-Sweden- and Germany-Sweden bond spread are plotted in figure 12. From the 
figure, we can see that Germany-Sweden bond spread has evolved in a similar way to 
Finland-Sweden bond spread before the crisis i.e. both bond spreads were moving 
towards the zero line where the bond yields are equal. It seems that the bond spread 
developments before the crisis can be partly explained by the convergence of Sweden 
and Finland bond yields because the co-movement with Germany-Sweden bond spread 
suggests that the Finland-Sweden bond spread developments weren`t caused solely by 
the changes in the theoretical bond pricing elements such as credit risk. This supports 
the results from the regression analysis that the fiscal fundamentals were not important 
during the period 01/1995-12/2013.  
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Figure 11. Finland`s, Germany`s, United Kingdom`s and Sweden`s 10-year bond yield. 
Time period 01/1993-03/2015. Source. ECB 
 
Figure 12. Finland-Sweden bond spread and Germany-Sweden bond spread. Time 
period 01/1993-03/2015. Source. Bank of Finland and Riksbank 
9  Conlusions 
 
In the thesis, I have tried to find the reasons for the Finland-Sweden 10-year bond yield 
spread developments during 1995-2013. I have used linear regression models to study 
the determinants of the bond spread. The results suggest that the country specific fiscal 
fundamentals have not played an important role in the bond spread developments. This 
is in line with the euro area bond spread developments before the crisis period, when 
countries with weak fiscal fundamentals such as Greece, were able to borrow at nearly 
same rates as Germany. However, the low frequency data for the fiscal fundamentals is 
a problem in the study. To account for the credit risk more effectively, one could use, for 
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example, CDS spreads since the data is available in higher frequencies
43
. I have also 
studied different subperiods and the results suggest that during 07/2007-12/2013, VIX-
index may have been important determinant of the Finland-Sweden bond spread. This 
result suggests that increased risk aversion has affected the bond spread.  
 
I also examined the bond spread developments by plotting the bond spread with special 
events that have taken place during 07/2007-12/2013. In addition, I looked for other 
bond spreads such as the Germany-Sweden- and Finland-Germany bond spread, to see 
whether the special events have affected these bond spreads differently.  There seems to 
have been some kind of convergence in bond yields across Finland, Germany and 
Sweden, which is likely to account for part of the spread developments before the crisis. 
The OMT announcement is the most notable event that has probably affected the bond 
spread. It seems that the OMT was the program needed to calm the financial markets, 
and thus Finland is again able to borrow money for lower rates compared to Sweden
44
.  
 
To answer to the question whether the EMU membership has affected on Finland`s bond 
yields, I would conclude that during the crisis period, Finland`s bond yield has been 
negatively affected by the EMU membership, but mainly because it could have 
benefited more from the increased risk aversion
45
. Finland`s bond yield has decreased 
during the crisis, although the bond spreads against Germany and Sweden have 
occasionally increased. However, it seems that if Finland wouldn`t have been a strong 
AAA-credit rating country during the crisis, it would have experienced the destiny of 
rising bond yields like Spain and Italy did, probably due to the lack of lender last resort. 
 
 To summarize the results, the main reasons affecting Finland-Sweden bond spread 
before the crisis were not likely the country specific fundamentals but rather the 
convergence of bond yields across Sweden and euro countries. During the crisis, the 
increased risk aversion and the lack of lender of last resort (until the OMT), may have 
played the key roles in the bond spread developments. 
                                                 
43 For example, Kilponen et al. (2012) and Barrios (2009) use CDS spreads in their study. 
 
44 Studies that support OMT`s effect on euro area bond yields: De Santis (2013), Altavilla et al. (2014), 
Saka et al. (2014) and Hochstein  (2013) 
 
45 Countries with own currency and thus with a lender of last resort such as UK and Sweden benefited 
from risk aversion during the crisis, so it`s likely that Finland would have experienced the same, for 
example, if OMT was announced earlier. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 13. Finland-Sweden 10-year bond spread and Expected exchange rate variable 
(EEXR). EEXR equals the spread of Germany`s and Sweden`s 6-month treasury bill 
yields. Positive values for both variables (before the crisis) are on the red areas. Red 
horizontal line is zero-line for EEXR. Black horizontal line is zero-line for FS-spread. 
Time period 01/1995-12/2013. Source. Bank of Finland and Riksbank. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 14. Germany-Sweden 10-year bond spread and Expected exchange rate variable 
(EEXR). EEXR equals the spread of Germany`s and Sweden`s 6-month treasury bill 
yields. Time period 01/1995-12/2013. Source. Bundesbank and Riksbank. 
 
 
Data sources: 
1. BOND YIELDS 
 
Bond yields (monthly data):  
Finland: Suomen Pankki. 
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/tilastot/korot/pages/tilastot_arvopaperimarkkinat_velka
paperit_viitelainojen_korot_en.aspx 
Germany: Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/ 
Sweden: Riskbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/ 
  
 
Bond yields (weekly and daily data): 
Finland: Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/  
Germany: Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/ 
Sweden: Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/ 
 
Bond yields (data for figures 2 & 13). ECB. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html 
 
2. CREDIT RISK  
 
Debt to GDP data:  
Finland. Eurostat. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=ts
dde410 
Sweden. Eurostat. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=ts
dde410 
 
Deficit to GDP 
Finland: Countryeconomy. http://countryeconomy.com/deficit/finland 
Sweden. Countryeconomy. http://countryeconomy.com/deficit/sweden 
 
GDP growth rate 
Finland: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702# 
Sweden: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702# 
 
Current account balance to GDP 
Finland: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702 
Sweden: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702 
 
Real effective exchange rate 
  
Finland: World bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PX.REX.REER 
Sweden: World bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PX.REX.REER 
 
Forecasts for GDP growth rate, Current account balance to GDP and Deficit to GDP.  
European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts/index_e
n.htm 
 
 
3. RISK AVERSION  
 
VIX-index 
Yahoo Finance. http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EVIX+Historical+Pricesxc 
 
 
4. LIQUIDITY  
 
Government bond market size data 
Finland: Valtiokonttori via email.  
Sweden: Statistics Sweden 
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__OE__OE0202/Statsskuld/?
rxid=b459c284-7688-4f24-bd90-8ad244071420  
 
5. EXPECTED EXCHANGE RATE 
 
Treasury bill yield data (maturity 6 months) 
Germany: Bundesbank. 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/Macro_eco
nomic_time_series/its_details_value_node.html?tsId=BBK01.WZ9807&listId=www_s1
40_it03a 
Sweden: Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/search-
interest-rates-exchange-rates/ 
 
6. INFLATION 
Consumer price index. OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=22519# 
Harmonized index of consumer prices. European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts/index_e
n.htm 
 
  
Table 2: Results from the models 7-10 (NW-standard errors) 
 
Dependent variable:Spread 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
VIX -0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Deficitgdp -0.009 0.005 
  
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
  
CA 
  
0.031 -0.030 
   
(0.029) (0.045) 
EEXR 
 
0.083 0.089 
 
  
(0.051) (0.054) 
 
Inflation 
 
0.024*** 0.017* 0.031** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) 
lagspread 0.973*** 0.707*** 0.707*** 0.928*** 
 
(0.026) (0.127) (0.132) (0.019) 
Constant 0.021 -0.041 -0.045 0.019 
 
(0.039) (0.053) (0.056) (0.037) 
Observations 149 149 149 149 
R2 0.932 0.944 0.944 0.934 
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.942 0.942 0.932 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 2. Results from the models 7-10. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Period studied 01/1995-06/2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Results from the models 11-15 
 
Dependent variable: Spread 
  
(Models 11,14,15 
  
NW-SE) 
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VIX 0.005*** 0.005** 0.003 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0004) 
Deficitgdp 0.005 0.012 
   
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
   
CA 
  
0.181* -0.013 
 
   
(0.099) (0.116) 
 
EEXR 
 
-0.057** -0.089*** 
  
  
(0.024) (0.032) 
  
Inflation 
 
-0.024 0.001 -0.004 
 
  
(0.018) (0.020) (0.035) 
 
lagspread 0.854*** 0.858*** 0.887*** 0.854*** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.050) (0.052) (0.075) 
 
lag(Spread, 1) 
    
0.951*** 
     
(0.014) 
Constant -0.088** -0.084* -0.124*** -0.096* -0.027*** 
 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.041) (0.051) (0.009) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 338 
R2 0.902 0.909 0.911 0.901 0.963 
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.902 0.904 0.896 0.963 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 3. Results from the models 11-15. Standard errors in parentheses (Models 11, 14 
and 15 with Newey-West standard errors). Period studied 07/2007-12/2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Results from the models 16-19 (NW-standard errors) 
 
Dependent variable: Spread 
 
(16) (17) (18) (19) 
VIX 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DeficitgdpF 0.004 0.0003 
  
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
  
CAF 
  
0.003 0.003 
   
(0.003) (0.002) 
EEXR 
 
0.004 0.0005 
 
  
(0.018) (0.018) 
 
InflationF 
 
0.050* 0.049 0.049 
  
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
lag(Spread, 1) 0.964*** 0.939*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.035) 
Constant -0.022 -0.048 -0.025 -0.024 
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.046) (0.038) 
Observations 143 143 143 143 
R2 0.942 0.943 0.944 0.944 
Adjusted R2 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.942 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.0 
 
Table 4. Results from the models 16-19. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Period studied 01/2002-12/2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Results from the models 20-27 
 
Dependent variable: Spread 
                                                                                     (Model 24 NW-SE) 
 
(20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
VIX -0.003** -0.001 -0.002 -0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DeficitgdpF -0.018 -0.027 
  
0.002 0.009 
  
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
  
(0.011) (0.010) 
  
CAF 
  
-0.004 -0.009** 
  
0.023*** 0.016*** 
   
(0.005) (0.004) 
  
(0.006) (0.006) 
EEXR 
 
0.085*** 0.061 
  
-0.045* -0.070*** 
 
  
(0.030) (0.039) 
  
(0.026) (0.022) 
 
InflationF 
 
-0.094*** -0.086*** -0.067** 
 
-0.034 -0.108* -0.007 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) 
 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.056) 
lagspread 0.939*** 0.789*** 0.836*** 0.914*** 0.855*** 0.859*** 0.894*** 0.871*** 
 
(0.030) (0.061) (0.061) (0.031) (0.07) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051) 
Constant 0.060*** 0.041 0.026 0.056** -0.094** -0.105** 0.069 0.040 
 
(0.018) (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.045) (0.061) (0.064) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 77 77 77 77 
R2 0.970 0.975 0.974 0.973 0.901 0.906 0.923 0.912 
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.973 0.972 0.971 0.897 0.899 0.917 0.907 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.0 
  
Table 5. Results from the models 20-27. Period studied: 01/2002-06/2007 (Models 20-
23) and 07/2007-12/2013 (Models 24-27). Standard errors in parentheses. Model 24 
with Newey-West standard errors. 
 
